How a Fed Overhaul Could Eliminate the Federal Debt Crisis, Part I: The Fed’s Hidden Drain

he Federal Reserve’s independence is currently being challenged by political forces seeking to reshape its mandate. The Fed has not always been independent of Congress and the Treasury. Its independence was formalized only in 1951, with a Treasury-Federal Reserve Accord that was not a law but a policy agreement redefining the relationship of the parties. In the 1930s and 1940s, before the Fed officially became “independent,” it worked with the federal government to fund the most productive period in our country’s history. We can and should do that again.

In a Sept. 1 Substack post titled “Fed Faces Biggest Direct Challenge by a President Since JFK – and This Is a Good Thing,” UK Prof. Richard Werner shows that there is no evidence that more independent central banks deliver lower inflation. In fact, per his findings, central bank independence has no measurable impact on real economic performance, and greater central bank independence has resulted in lower economic growth.

This two-part series will probe the forces in play now to overhaul the Fed, and the feasibility of redirecting it to use its tools, including “quantitative easing,” not just to save the banks but to save the economy. Part I looks at a particularly flawed Fed policy — Interest on Reserves (IOR) — which burdens the budget, stifles liquidity, and subsidizes banks. Then it suggests ways that eliminating IOR and reining in the Fed’s independence could solve the Treasury’s interest burden altogether.

Continue reading here.